Can food security be bought?
A structural analysis of the Saudi food security model — its achievements, vulnerabilities, and the real test it faced in 2022.
Introduction
In March 2022, the Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO) food price index reached its highest level since its launch in 1990, hitting 159.7 points. This was no coincidence — it was the formal announcement of the end of an era.
An era in which nations believed that global markets would remain open and that food would always flow to those who could afford it. What the 2022 crisis revealed was that this equation — however economically rational — was built on an assumption whose fragility was fully exposed by war, pandemics, and export bans.
Saudi Arabia imports more than 80% of its food needs, with a bill exceeding $29.8 billion in 2022 (GASTAT). This figure is not a failure — it is the inevitable result of inescapable geographical realities: desert, water scarcity, and a climate hostile to traditional agriculture. But the more important question today is not why we import — it is: what happens when markets close their doors?
How Did Saudi Arabia Build Its Food Model?
Over the past decades, Saudi Arabia has pursued a clear and deliberate strategy: rather than forcing land without water to produce food, production is relocated to where resources are available, and supply is secured from abroad.
This model rests on three pillars:
Saudi Arabia imports more than 29.4 million tons of agricultural products annually. Wheat alone: 4.16 million tons in 2023/24 (Russia 49%, EU 41%). Barley: 2.5 million tons. Corn: 4.74 million tons. These figures reflect the scale of dependency, but also efficiency in pricing and diversification.
The Saudi Agricultural and Livestock Investment Company (SALIC), 100% owned by the Public Investment Fund, operates across 5 continents with productive assets spanning more than 400,000 hectares. Its most notable deals include: acquiring 80.01% of Olam Agri at a total value exceeding $4 billion (2022–2025), Australian Baladjie farms (~200,000 hectares), stakes in Brazilian BRF and Canada's G3 grain group.
Companies such as Almarai (2024 revenues: SAR 20.5 billion) and NADEC (2024 revenues: SAR 3.2 billion) form the backbone of domestic production, particularly in dairy, poultry, and agricultural products.
Owning agricultural assets outside your borders does not mean controlling access to food — the difference between the two is the difference between holding a deed and having a genuine guarantee.
What Did the 2022 Crisis Reveal?
The Russia-Ukraine war was not merely a regional conflict — it was a stress test for the global food security model. Russia and Ukraine together account for roughly 30% of global wheat exports. When the corridors were disrupted, the gap immediately became a crisis.
The most dangerous development was not the price surge — it was the decision by 32 countries to suspend food exports during the peak of the crisis. These countries included: India (wheat), Indonesia (palm oil), Malaysia (chicken), and Argentina (meat). In other words, 17% of all calories traded globally stopped moving at the same moment.
This is where the fundamental flaw in any import-only model becomes apparent: holding a purchase contract does not guarantee delivery when the exporting country decides to protect its own citizens first. Even SALIC, with its farms spanning 54,000 hectares in Ukraine, faced direct logistical disruptions due to the war.
stopped moving simultaneously.
What Happens When the Corridors Actually Close?
This is no longer a theoretical scenario. In March 2026, Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz amid rapidly escalating regional tensions, causing tanker traffic to fall by 70% and Dammam port throughput to decline by 50–60%. Yet no direct food crisis materialized within Saudi Arabia — and this deserves precise analysis rather than premature celebration.
First: the widely circulated figure that "70% of Saudi food passes through Hormuz" is inaccurate. That figure describes Gulf states collectively. Saudi Arabia's reality is different — thanks to its long western coastline, only about 40% of Saudi food imports pass through Hormuz, while the majority arrives at the ports of Jeddah, Yanbu, and Jizan on the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia is the only Gulf state with a genuine geographical alternative.
Second: the apparent stability is not evidence of invulnerability — it is evidence that the strategic stockpile (3–4 months) and logistical rerouting via the Red Sea are functioning as designed. But this strategic depth is being consumed in real time, not replenished.
The most dangerous scenario is not the closure of Hormuz alone — it is the simultaneous closure of two chokepoints: Hormuz from the east and Bab el-Mandeb from the west. In that case, Saudi Arabia loses its only geographical advantage, and the situation shifts from managing a disruption to an existential challenge to supply chains. What appears as stability today is in reality strategic depth being consumed at cost, with a finite horizon.
Concentrated Risk: Where Does Saudi Arabia's Wheat Come From?
Three Layers — One of Them Missing
Saudi Arabia's food security system today can be read through three overlapping layers:
What reached food and agri-tech startups combined in 2024 amounts to no more than $45 million — just 6% of total Saudi venture capital fund investments of $750 million, and less than 0.3% of total global investment in the sector. This figure excludes direct SALIC or PIF investments — it reflects what actually reaches the emerging tech layer.
Source: AgFunder Developing Markets AgriFoodTech Report 2025 · Saudi Venture Capital Report 2024
The Sovereign Agricultural Arm — A Global Portfolio of Strategic Assets
What Does All This Mean?
The current Saudi food security model is not a failure — it is intelligently designed for an environment that once prevailed. The Kingdom achieved a global ranking of 41st on the Global Food Security Index (GFSI) with a score of 69.9, a remarkable achievement for a country with no rivers and no regular rainfall.
But the structure that got us here is not the structure that will take us forward. The world of 2022 — with its wars and export bans — proved that relying on open international markets is an assumption that does not hold in moments of crisis. The Kingdom's population nearly doubling toward 40 million by 2030 will place increasing pressure on every link in the supply chain.
The question that poses itself is not: do we continue importing? — the answer is necessarily yes. Rather: do we have the system that guarantees food access when markets close their doors?
What the April 2026 test revealed is that current resilience is real — but temporal, not permanent. Stockpiles are being consumed, logistical rerouting has limits, and the Red Sea geographical advantage disappears the moment the threat returns to Bab el-Mandeb. The stability we see today is not evidence of invulnerability — it is prepaid strategic depth, with a finite shelf life.
And the matter extends beyond supply chains. Control over food in the future will not be tied solely to who owns the farm or the contract — but to who owns the technology: engineered seeds, precision agriculture systems, and digital supply chains capable of adapting in real time. This layer, less visible today, will be the most critical tomorrow.
The missing layer in this system is technology — controlled-environment agriculture that produces with less water, digital supply chains that anticipate crises before they occur, and alternative protein that reduces import dependency. This is the subject of our next paper.
Three Truths That Must Be Read Together
First Truth: Saudi Arabia is not managed haphazardly — the SALIC model, SAGO reserves, and Almarai's strength reflect long-term strategic thinking.
Second Truth: This model was built for a stable world that no longer exists — and the cascading crises since 2020 have proven this with numbers that allow no debate.
Third Truth: The missing layer — food and agri-tech — is the largest untapped opportunity. What actually reaches food and agri-tech startups amounts to no more than $45 million — just 6% of total Saudi venture capital fund investments, against a food import bill of $29.8 billion. The gap between these two figures is the opportunity itself.
